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Abstract
We initiate examination of the political boundaries of the ﬁrm by exploring the phe-
nomenon of “businessman candidates”: business owners and managers who bypass conven-
tional means of political inﬂuence to run for public ofﬁce themselves. We argue that in-house
production of political inﬂuence will be more likely in institutional environments where can-
didates ﬁnd it difﬁcult to make binding campaign promises. When campaign promises are
binding, then a businessman may always pay a professional politician to run on the platform
that political competition would otherwise compel the businessman to adopt. In contrast, when
commitment to a campaign platform is impossible, then candidate identity matters for the poli-
cies that will be adopted ex post, implying that a businessman may choose to run for ofﬁce if
the stakes are sufﬁciently large. We illustrate our arguments through discussion of guberna-
torial elections in postcommunist Russia, where businessmen frequently run for public ofﬁce,
institutions to encourage elected ofﬁcials to keep their campaign promises are weak, and com-
petition for rents is intense.
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In politics as in commerce, ﬁrms face a “make or buy” decision. Inﬂuence can be “bought” through
the provision of campaign ﬁnance to favored candidates during election campaigns, or the appli-
cation of lobbying power when dealing with elected politicians.1 Alternatively, businessmen may
“make” their own inﬂuence by running for public ofﬁce themselves.2 This paper focuses on the
latter phenomenon.
"Businessmancandidates”ﬁrstcaughtoureyeinpostcommunistRussia, whereownersorman-
agers of large businesses have in recent years frequently run for public ofﬁce. We present some
evidence below of the prevalence of this inﬂuence strategy in Russia. However, there are numerous
examples of similar candidacies in other political-economic contexts. Various authors (e.g., Dahl,
1961; Bradley and Zald, 1965; Pessen, 1972; Kipp III, 1977) have noted that 19th-century urban
mayors and aldermen in the U.S. were disproportionately drawn from the business elite, while
Crandall (1950) discusses the frequent direct involvement of 19th-century U.S. railroad presidents
in politics. (On the latter point, recall that Leland Stanford served as governor of California and
U.S. Senator contemporaneously with his tenure as president of Central Paciﬁc Railroad.) Sheehan
(1968) reports that during the 1870s and 1880s businessmen were increasingly drawn into German
politics. In Thailand, “tycoons” dominated party politics in the 1980s (Laothamatas, 1988), while
in various societies estate owners have populated more-or-less democratically elected parliaments
(see, e.g., Zeitlin, Neuman and Ratcliff (1976) on early 20th-century Chile). Finally, in Ukraine (a
country which shares a number of institutional characteristics with Russia), large business owners
and managers have been elected to parliament and mayoral ofﬁce.3
1For a review and synthesis of the literature on special-interest politics in established democracies, see Grossman
and Helpman (2001).
2In this paper, we use the non-gender-neutral term “businessman” to refer to businessmen and businesswomen.
We do so a) because we ﬁnd the more neutral term “businessperson” cumbersome, and b) because in our judgement
the phenomenon we describe in this paper has historically involved businessmen rather than businesswomen. On the
latter point, this judgement is certainly correct for contemporary Russia, a case we examine in detail, and seems to be
so for the other political contexts we survey below. We personally look forward to increased participation by women
in business and politics in Russia and elsewhere, if not necessarily to increased participation by businessmen and
businesswomen in politics.
3See, e.g., “Banker Wins Ukrainian By-Election,” Ukrainian Television First Channel (BBC Monitoring), June 9,
2003; “Ukrainian Paper Proﬁles New Lviv Mayor,” Ukrayina Moloda (BBC Monitoring), April 4, 2003; or “Kyiv
Developer Eyes Rada, Council Seats,” Kyiv Post, March 28, 2002. The last story proﬁles an attempt by a Kyiv real
estate developer to capture not only a parliamentary seat through his own candidacy, but up to 30 seats in the Kyiv city
council through the candidacies of employees of his real estate ﬁrm.
1What many of these examples share is an environment that can be thought of as “weakly in-
stitutionalized” in the following respect: Politicians in immature democracies may be especially
tempted to renege on campaign promises, as institutional mechanisms such as political parties
which would otherwise discourage opportunistic behavior by their members (Alesina and Spear,
1988; Cox and McCubbins, 1994; Aldrich, 1995) are underdeveloped.4 Consequently, elections do
not serve the disciplining role that they do in established democracies, where politicians are mo-
tivated to appeal to the center by making binding campaign promises. Instead, politics is a battle
of personalities, where voters anticipate post-electoral behavior based on who a candidate is rather
than what he has promised.
As a consequence, businessmen may be more inclined to enter the electoral arena when com-
mitment power is lacking. Conditional on being able to win, businessmen can implement more
favorable policies and save lobbying costs by obtaining political power directly. In contrast, when
campaign promises are binding, policy will more or less reﬂect the preferences of the median voter
regardless of who is running. In such an environment, it will often be cheaper for a businessman to
ﬁnance the campaign of a professional politician than to run himself. (Implicit in this discussion
is the assumption that businessmen will still have an incentive to favor their businesses once in
ofﬁce. While this may not hold where laws exist and are enforced requiring divestiture of assets
by ofﬁce holders, it seems to be true in many of the weakly institutionalized environments where
businessman candidates are most common.)
Our theory bears a strong resemblance to the literature on “boundaries of the ﬁrm,” where the
choice between in-house production and purchase from an outside supplier has efﬁciency conse-
quences when contracts are incomplete (e.g., Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985; Klein, Craw-
ford and Alchian, 1978; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). But in our case it is
a contract with an outside party – the voters – that matters. One consequence of this difference is
that the outcome when commitment is possible is not necessarily jointly efﬁcient from the point of
view of the businessman and professional politicians. Candidates may prefer the outcome where
no one has committed to any policy, as not committing preserves the opportunity to reap gains
from trade when policy is made after the election. Nonetheless, when a contract with the electorate
4Our paper follows Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2003) in exploring the political economics of environments
with very weak institutions.
2is binding, candidates have no choice but to appeal to the median voter.
In modeling the endogenous participation of candidates, our paper builds on the “citizen-
candidate” literature of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). As in that
literature, citizens (here, businessmen) may run for public ofﬁce because of the inability of pro-
fessional politicians to make binding campaign promises. Our paper expands upon this work by
showing how the entry decision depends on the commitment technology available to political can-
didates; in contrast, other papers in the citizen-candidate literature take the inability to commit as
given. Further, as in Besley and Coate (2001), we enrichen the basic citizen-candidate environ-
ment by considering the possibility that the winning candidate may be lobbied ex post, relying on
the now-standard menu-auction model of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), ﬁrst fully exploited in a
political context by Grossman and Helpman (1994).
More generally, our work complements the political-economy literature on the role of institu-
tions as commitment mechanisms (e.g., Shepsle and Weingast, 1979; North and Weingast, 1989;
North, 1993; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001). In our story, the phenomenon of businessman
candidates rests on the weakness of institutions such as political parties which in other environ-
ments serveas commitmentdevices forpolitical candidates. While we takethe presenceor absence
of such institutions as exogenous, future work might consider the consequences of businessman
candidacy for the development of parties and other institutions which serve to constrain the behav-
ior of state ofﬁcials.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present the basic model, showing that strong
forces exist to discourage businessmen from running for public ofﬁce themselves when electoral
commitment is possible, while “businessman candidacies” may emerge in equilibrium when com-
mitment is lacking. Section 3 extends the model to a setting in which businesses compete with
each other for rents. As we demonstrate, such competition increases the incentives for business-
men to run for public ofﬁce when commitment is impossible, as an elected politician can otherwise
play one business off of another and capture a large portion of the rents for himself. Section 4 dis-
cusses our results in the context of electoral politics in contemporary Russia, where businessmen
frequently run for public ofﬁce, institutions to encourage elected ofﬁcials to keep their campaign
promises are weak, and competition for rents is intense. Section 5 discusses our results. Technical
proofs are relegated to the appendix.
32 Basic Model
2.1 Environment
Consider a model with three strategic players – a “left” politician (L), a “right” politician (R), and
a businessman (B) – who contest policy along a single dimension, where the policy space is the
real number line R. Any of the three players is potentially a candidate for ofﬁce, where voters with
preferences over policy choose among the players who have entered the electoral campaign.
The professional politicians P ∈ {L,R} have preferences represented by the following (von
Neumann-Morgenstern) utility function:
uP = −γP(x−xP)
2+C−1(enter)·q+1(win)·v (1)
where γP ∈ {γL,γR} captures the degree to which professional politicians value policy relative to
other concerns; x is the policy implemented while xP is the politician’s ideal point; C is any com-
pensation paid ex post by the businessman to the politician in return for implementing a particular
policy; 1(.) is an indicator variable, taking on a value of one if the politician has entered and won,
and zero otherwise; q is a vanishingly small cost of entry; and v is a vanishingly small rent from
holding ofﬁce (separate from any compensation C that might be earned while holding ofﬁce). For
simplicity, we assume that γL = γR. Note that our assumption that policy preferences are quadratic
captures the idea that a politician need be compensated more for a given change in policy, the
farther is policy from his ideal point.
Similarly, the businessman has preferences represented by:
uB = −γB(x−xB)
2−C−1(enter)·k+1(win)·v (2)
where γB captures the importance of policy relative to other concerns for the businessman, xB is the
businessman’s ideal point, and k > q,v is some non-trivial cost of entry. Note that k > q is the key
assumption of the model: the opportunity cost of running for public ofﬁce is assumed to be greater
for the businessman than for professional politicians. The most obvious way to rationalize this
is to note that the businessman must necessarily divert effort from business activities to manage
a political campaign, while a professional politician may have few attractive options outside of
politics. Alternatively, we can think of (k−q) as the additional time and money that a businessman
4must spend to make himself known to the general public.
We assume that voters have Euclidean preferences – they always prefer a policy closer to their
“ideal point” (most preferred policy) to one further away, whether that policy is to the left or right
of their ideal point – and that they vote “sincerely,” i.e. vote for the candidate who they expect to
implement the policy closest to their ideal point, regardless of how other voters are expected to
cast their ballot.5 If indifferent among all candidates, a voter randomly chooses one candidate for
whom to vote.6
Voters have ideal points distributed on R, with the median ideal point xm unique.7 We assume
that the politicians and businessman must decide whether or not to enter the campaign before this
distribution is known with certainty. Formally, let {Fw(·)}w be a family of distribution functions
indexed by w, with G the measure of w and xm = xm(w) = F−1
w
 1
2

. Then we may deﬁne the
distribution of xm as H(x) =
R
1(xm ≤ x)dG, where 1(.) is the indicator function, which takes a
value of one if the statement is true and zero otherwise. We assume that H(x) = 0 for x < µ −δ,
and H(x) = 1 for x ≥ µ +δ, where µ = E(xm) and δ = (xB−µ). Thus, the businessman has
“extreme” preferences, in the sense that the median voter will always prefer a policy (weakly) to
the left of the businessman’s ideal point. Further, we order the players’ ideal points such that:
µ −δ < xL < µ < xR < xB = µ +δ (3)
so that xL is located to the left of the expected position of the median voter, xR to the right, and xB
further from the expected position of the median voter than is either professional politician. Im-
plicitly, we are assuming the existence of “real” political competition, so that politics is potentially
contested by candidates at both ends of the political spectrum who are (ex ante) more moderate
than is the businessman.
The following sequence of play is observed, where brackets indicate a stage that exists only
in the version of the game where commitment is possible. All elements of the game are common
knowledge.
1. Entry: Simultaneouslyandindependently, thebusinessmanandtwopoliticiansdecidewhether
5In the citizen-candidate literature, Osborne and Slivinski (1996) consider sincere voting, while Besley and Coate
(1997) assume strategic voting.
6Alternatively, we could assume that indifferent voters abstain.
7A sufﬁcient (but not necessary) condition for existence of a unique median ideal point is that the distribution of
ideal points be continuous and increasing on some interval of R.
5or not to enter the race.
2. Resolution of uncertainty: The random variable w is realized, so that the distribution of
voters’idealpoints(andinparticular, themedianidealpointxm)isnowknownwithcertainty.
3. [Commitment]: Any candidate i who has entered may commit to a policy ˆ xi to be pursued
after the election, with commitment decisions made simultaneously and independently.
4. Election: Voters cast their ballot for the candidate who they expect will pursue a policy
closest to their own ideal point after the election. We assume that the election operates by a
“runoff” rule, so that if no candidate wins an absolute majority in the ﬁrst round, voters vote
again, choosing among the two top vote getters in the ﬁrst round. Ties are broken using an
equal-probability rule.
5. Policy choice/lobbying: If the winning candidate has committed to a policy to be pursued
after the election, that policy is chosen. If no commitment has been made and the winning
candidate is one of the politicians (L or R), the businessman offers a compensation schedule
C(x), which for all x ∈ Â gives the amount of compensation the businessman will pay to
the politician in return for implementing policy x. Following receipt of the schedule, the
winning candidate chooses some policy x. If no commitment has been made and the winning
candidate is the businessman, the businessman simply chooses some policy x, since there is
no one to lobby the politician. Finally, we assume that if no candidate has entered, some
status quo policy x0 will be implemented.8
Two features of our formalization deserve further comment. First, note that we assume that
uncertainty about the position of the median voter is resolved prior to the making of any policy
commitments (when commitment is possible), in contrast to “probabilistic voting” models of po-
litical competition. This should be understood as follows: in principle there may be uncertainty
that is resolved both between entry and commitment, and between commitment and the election.
As with variants on the standard Downsian model, we assume away the latter type of uncertainty
for simplicity, since we are merely interested in general convergence towards the median voter,
8With negligible entry costs for the two professional politicians, some politician will always prefer to enter rather
than accept the status quo.
6which one gets (completely) with deterministic models and (mostly) with probabilistic models.
However, our interest in entry demands consideration of the former type of uncertainty, a factor
ignored in those models that take entry as given.
Second, in assuming that elections operate according to a runoff rule, we model the elections
involving businessman candidates that we know best: gubernatorial elections in contemporary
Russia.9 As a practical matter, runoff elections produce clean predictions about platform choice
when there are three candidates who have the ability to make binding campaign promises, a feature
not shared by plurality rule (see, e.g., Osborne, 1995). Our general results will hold to the extent
that other electoral systems encourage convergence to some policy when campaign promises are
credible, a point we address at greater length in Section 5 below.
2.2 Equilibrium When Commitment Possible
We begin our analysis by focusing on political environments where reputational mechanisms such
as political parties allow politicians to make binding campaign promises, i.e. we examine the ver-
sion of the model in which it is possible to commit to some policy to be pursued after the election.
However, since commitment is merely an option, and not imposed, we must ﬁrst determine the pol-
icy pursued after the election by a player who is elected without having committed to any particular
policy.
Clearly, if the businessman is elected without having made any binding campaign promise, he
will implement xB after the election: there is no one else to lobby him. In contrast, if a professional
politician is elected, then as discussed above the businessman lobbies by providing a compensation
scheduleC(x) giving the amount of compensationC ≥ 0 to be paid when policy x is implemented.
Withonebusinessman, theoutcomeofthislobbyinggameisstraightforward: theelectedpoliti-
cian implements the policy that maximizes his and the businessman’s joint payoff, and the busi-
nessman provides just enough compensation so that the politician is no worse off than if he had
implemented his most preferred policy. (For discussion, see Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and
9Callander (2003) discusses use of the runoff rule in other political contexts. Our results for a position-taking
game with runoff elections in which candidates are primarily policy-seeking expand on previous theoretical work
on the runoff rule. Earlier contributions include Osborne and Slivinski (1996), who analyze runoff elections when
candidates cannot commit to policy platforms, and Haan and Volkerink (2001) and Callander (2003), who assume that
candidates are ofﬁce-seeking.
7Grossman and Helpman (1994).)
Proposition 1. (Lobbying) If the winning candidate is a professional politician P ∈ {L,R} who
has not committed to some policy to be pursued after the election, that politician chooses:
¯ x(P) = αxP+(1−α)xB (4)
where α =
γP
γP+γB, in return for which the businessman provides the following compensation:
¯ C(P) = γP(¯ x(P)−xP)
2 (5)
Proof. Omitted.
As Proposition 1 indicates, the policy implemented by the winning politician is a weighted
average of his and the businessman’s ideal points, where the weighting depends on the relative
importance each of the two parties places on policy vs. other considerations.
With the outcome of the policy-choice stage in hand, we can proceed to consideration of the
policy chosen by any candidate who has entered the race. When there is one candidate, by Propo-
sition 1 that candidate (who will win whatever position he chooses) will be indifferent between
committing to his most preferred policy (i.e. choosing ˆ xi = xi) and not committing. In contrast,
whentherearetwocandidates, bothcandidatescommittoxm. Toseethis, notethatatwo-candidate
runoff election is equivalent to a two-candidate plurality-rule election. Since both candidates re-
ceive some small exogenous rent v from holding ofﬁce, the election essentially reduces to the
standard Downsian model, though the logic is slightly complicated by the fact that each politician
P may choose not to commit and thus retain the option of implementing ¯ x(P) in return for ¯ C(P)
ex post.
Proposition 2. (Policy choice with two candidates) When it is possible to commit to a policy to be
pursued after the election and two players have entered the race, both candidates will choose to
commit to the policy preferred by the median voter, xm.
Proof. See appendix.
The proof of Proposition 2 relies on the fact that for any conﬁguration of positions (either
committed to or implied) other than (xm,xm), at least one candidate always has an incentive to
adopt a position no more than some inﬁnitesimal ε away from the expected winning policy, thus
8gaining at least a share of the exogenous rent v while sacriﬁcing essentially nothing in terms of
policy utility. (When the two candidates adopt positions some equal distance to each side of xm,
then by deviating to xm a candidate can not only win for sure and thus gain v
2, but can actually
increase his policy utility since xm is now implemented with certainty: recall that players are risk-
averse with respect to policy.) The same basic logic applies to the case when three candidates have
entered:
Proposition 3. (Policy choice with three candidates) When it is possible to commit to a policy to
be pursued after the election and all three players have entered the race, all candidates will choose
to commit to the policy preferred by the median voter, xm.
Proof. See appendix.
Thus, whether two or three candidates have entered, the policy outcome is the same: xm will be
implemented ex post. This immediately implies that there would never be an equilibrium in which
all three candidates enter, since the businessman with his non-trivial entry cost k would prefer not
to have entered, since by not entering he can receive the same policy payoff at a savings of k (less
his share of the inﬁnitesimal exogenous rent v from holding ofﬁce).
Slightly less obvious is that the businessman would always prefer not to enter if he expects
only R to enter. By the logic of Proposition 2, if the businessman stays in the race he must accept
xm, whatever the realization of that random variable turns out to be. In contrast, by not entering he
will receive either xR or ¯ x(R), the policy implemented by R ex post when R runs unopposed. Since
xR > µ = E(xm), this is preferable for the businessman (though verifying this takes a bit of work,
since xm is a random variable and the businessman is risk-averse – see the proof to Proposition 4
for details). By a similar logic, the businessman would never enter alone, since L would always
prefer to enter and move policy to some xm < xB.
Indeed, theonlypossibleequilibriuminwhichthebusinessmanenterswhencampaignpromises
are binding has B entering together with L. The fact that the businessman prefers entering to not in
this equilibrium (when it exists) is due solely to the fact that R has not entered, since by Proposition
2 the same policy outcome can be achieved if R had entered instead of B, and the businessman’s
cost of entry k outweighs his share of the exogenous rent from holding ofﬁce. Whether or not this
equilibrium exists depends in particular on k (intuitively, the businessman will be more likely to
9enter when his opportunity cost of running is low) and (xB−xL) (the businessman will be more
likely to enter when he has more to lose from leaving the election to L).
These observations are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. (Businessman candidates) When it is possible to commit to a policy to be pur-
sued after the election, the only possible equilibrium involving entry of the businessman has the
businessman and the “left” candidate entering, while the “right” candidate stays out of the race.
Proof. See appendix.
Thus, there is at most one equilibrium involving entry by the businessman when campaign
promises are credible. Moreover, that equilibrium is inefﬁcient: the same policy outcome could be
achieved if R entered rather than B, at a savings of (k−q), the difference between the business-
man’s and R’s opportunity cost of running. This implies that there are potentially gains from trade,
with the businessman paying R to run in his stead. Note that such a contract will be self-enforcing
when the policy that L would pursue if unopposed during the election (either xL or ¯ x(L)) is suf-
ﬁciently far to the left: R will prefer to enter rather than leave policy to L, correctly anticipating
that the businessman will not enter, while by the logic of Proposition 4 the businessman will not
enter, knowing that R will. Further, even when not self-enforcing, it seems reasonable to believe
that the same reputational mechanisms that make campaign promises credible will encourage the
politician to hold up his end of the bargain.
Proposition 5. (Pre-entry contracting) In an expanded game, where in a pre-entry contracting
stage the businessman can propose to a politician that the politician enter the race in exchange for
some compensation by the businessman, there is no equilibrium where the businessman enters.
Proof. Omitted.
2.3 Equilibrium When Commitment Impossible
In political environments where politicians may make binding campaign promises because of the
presence of reputational mechanisms such as strong political parties, potential candidates decide
not only whether to enter the race, but also what position to take upon entering. With platform
choice dictated by the logic of political competition, candidate identity becomes largely irrelevant.
10A businessmen therefore has little incentive to enter the race when commitment is possible, since
the same outcome can typically be achieved without his direct participation.
In contrast, when campaign promises are meaningless, candidate identity matters for the poli-
cies that will be adopted ex post, implying two reasons why a businessman might choose to enter
the race:
1. By winning, the businessman can implement a policy better than that which would be im-
plemented by another candidate.
2. By winning, the businessman can save the cost of lobbying the winning candidate after the
election.
Whether or not a businessman chooses to enter depends not only on his expectation of what
will happen if he does not (i.e. on his beliefs about who will enter and his understanding of what
will happen ex post if they do), but on the likelihood that the businessman will win against those
other players who have entered. As the following example demonstrates, the expected gain from
entering may be sufﬁciently great to support outcomes impossible when campaign promises are
binding.
Example 1. (Three-candidate equilibria) To study runoff elections when candidates cannot make
binding campaign promises, we must make assumptions not only the distribution of the median
ideal point xm, but also about distribution of other ideal points. Recalling that {Fw(·)}w is a family
of distribution functions indexed by w, assume for simplicity that w is distributed uniformly on
[0,1], with each Fw(·) a normal distribution with mean w and variance close to 0. We may then
derive the probability that a candidate wins, conditional on the set of players who have entered the
race, as the probability that w is closer to the candidate’s implied position (i.e. the position that
11will be implemented by the candidate ex post) than it is to any other candidate’s implied position:10
Pr(L wins | L,R,B) =
¯ x(L)+ ¯ x(R)
2
(6)
Pr(R wins | L,R,B) =
xB− ¯ x(L)
2
(7)
Pr(B wins | L,R,B) = 1−
¯ x(R)+xB
2
(8)
Pr(L wins | L,R) =
¯ x(L)+ ¯ x(R)
2
(9)
Pr(L wins | L,B) =
¯ x(L)+xB
2
(10)
Pr(R wins | R,B) =
¯ x(R)+xB
2
(11)
Let L, R, and B have ideal points xL =
 1
2 −a

, xR =
 1
2 +b

, and xB =
 1
2 +b+c

, where a, b,
and c are positive numbers with a < b+c < 1
2. Observe that this meets our assumption about the
orderingofidealpointsgivenin(3). ThenifγL =γR =γB, thereisathree-candidateequilibriumfor
q and k are sufﬁciently low.11 Intuitively, when each player places equal weight on policy relative
to money, the implied positions for each of the professional politicians fall halfway between their
ideal points and the politician’s. Then each candidate has both a non-trivial probability of winning
and a strong incentive to stay in the race.
In particular, given our distributional assumptions, the probability that L wins remains the
same whether B stays in the race or withdraws. Thus, the businessman’s decision to remain in
the race reduces to whether the possibility of implementing his own ideal point and avoiding the
expense of lobbying outweighs the opportunity cost of being a candidate.
Beyond showing the existence of equilibria (for certain parameter values and distributional
assumptions) in which the businessman enters against L and R, Example 1 demonstrates that the
10This is derived for three-candidate elections as follows: For notational simplicity, let the three candidates’ posi-
tions be x, y, and z, with x ≤ y ≤ z, and refer to the candidates by their positions. Then in the ﬁrst round the share of
votes received by the three candidates is Fw(
x+y
2 ), Fw(
y+z
2 )−Fw(
x+y
2 ), and 1−Fw(
y+z
2 ), respectively. The candidates
that have the two highest shares advance to the second round. (Note that there is no need to separately consider the
case of a candidate who wins a majority in the ﬁrst round, as any such candidate would always win a second round.)
In the second round, x beats y if and only if Fw(
x+y
2 ) > 1
2, y beats z if and only if Fw(
y+z
2 ) > 1
2, and x beats z if and only
if Fw(x+z
2 ) > 1
2. Letting the variance of Fw(·) go to zero and recalling that w is distributed uniformly on [0,1] gives the
expressions in (6) to (11).
11Showing this is straightforward but a bit tedious, requiring substitution of ¯ x(L), ¯ x(R), ¯ C(L), and ¯ C(R) from
Proposition 1 into the conditions for each player to want to remain in the race rather than withdraw. Details are
available from the authors upon request.
12businessman may be less likely to pay R to run in his place when campaign promises are not
binding. Even if the businessman prefers that R run in his place against L, a contract to that effect
will not be self-enforcing if the businessman will nonetheless enter even if R is already running
against L (as will be the case when a three-candidate equilibrium exists). Further, as the following
example shows, if policy is sufﬁciently important to the businessman, he may prefer to run against
L on his own rather than pay R to run instead.
Example 2. (Invulnerability of (L,B) equilibrium to pre-entry contracting) Follow the previous
example, except now let γB go to inﬁnity while holding γL and γR ﬁxed. Then ¯ x(L) = ¯ x(R) = xB,
so the probability that R wins is zero when both L and B are candidates, while the probability
that L wins is the same regardless of who else is in the race, so long as there is at least one other
candidate (see the previous example). Consequently, for q and k sufﬁciently low, there will be an
equilibrium in which L and B enter but R does not: both L and B will prefer staying in the race to
leaving the ﬁeld to the other alone, while R will not enter since he cannot win and cannot change
the expected policy. Further, for k sufﬁciently low the businessman prefers this equilibrium to that
in which R runs against L, since the probability that L wins is the same in either case, and by
running the businessman may be able to save the cost of lobbying.
In sum, businessman candidates will generally be more likely in institutional environments
where candidates ﬁnd it difﬁcult to make binding campaign promises. Absent the disciplining ef-
fect of politicalcampaigns when commitment is possible, a businessman may anticipate substantial
gains from holding ofﬁce. When the opportunity cost of running is not too great, the businessman
may therefore choose to run even when the ﬁeld is crowded, and will generally be reticent to fund
somebody else’s campaign rather than run himself.
3 Competition for Rents
Up to now, we have restricted attention to an environment in which there is a single businessman
with an interest in inﬂuencing policy and potentially running for ofﬁce. In this section we extend
the model to examine the idea that competition for rents among businesses may make holding
ofﬁce more attractive, and therefore increase the likelihood that businessmen run for public ofﬁce.
13As we will see, this intuition holds only when commitment to policy is impossible. As in the
basic model, the nature of political competition discourages entry by businessmen when campaign
promises are credible.
To ﬁx ideas, modify the environment of Section 2.1 so that now there is one professional
politician P, with ideal point xP = µ, and two businessmen B ∈ {BL,BR}, with ideal points xBL <
µ <xBR and (xBR−µ)=(µ −xBL)≡δ. Both businessman have preferences analogous to those of
thebusinessmanintheprevioussection, withγB representingthedegreetowhicheachbusinessman
values policy relative to other concerns. As before, there is uncertainty over the distribution of
voters’ ideal points, with xm is distributed on some interval T ⊂ [µ −δ,µ +δ], where µ = E(xm).
In all other respects, the game is analogous to that presented above. Note that if the professional
politician does not commit to any policy and subsequently wins, then at the policy choice/lobbying
stage each businessman offers a compensation scheduleC(x). In contrast, if the winning candidate
is a businessman who has not made any commitment, then the other businessman alone submits a
schedule. Throughout we restrict ourselves to globally truthful compensation schedules, i.e. those
for which the slope of a businessman’s contribution schedule is equal to the marginal change in the
businessman’s policy payoff, wherever contributions are positive (for details, see Bernheim and
Whinston (1986) and Grossman and Helpman (1994)).
We can think of the presence of a single “moderate” politician as the reduced-form approxima-
tion of an environment with sufﬁcient political competition to encourage convergence to centrist
policies when candidates are able to making binding campaign promises. As in the model of the
previous section, this implies that no businessman will enter when commitment is possible.
Proposition 6. In the model with competition for rents, there is no equilibrium where either of the
two businessmen enters as a candidate when candidates can make binding campaign promises.
Proof. See appendix.
In contrast, when commitment is impossible, then there will exist equilibria with one or more
businessman candidates, as in the previous section. Such equilibria will be more more likely, the
larger is the competition for rents (as reﬂected either in the value γB that the businessmen put
on policy relative to other concerns, or the distance δ between their ideal points and that of the
14expected position of the median voter.) To establish this, we ﬁrst derive the policies chosen ex post
when the winning candidate has not committed.
Proposition 7. (Lobbying) In the model with competition for rents, any winning candidate who has
not committed to some policy will implement µ ex post. If the winning candidate is a businessman
B ∈ {BL,BR}, then the other businessman provides compensation:
ˆ C(B) = γB(µ −xB)
2 (12)
If the winning candidate is the professional politician P, then BL and BR provide compensation
ˆ CBL(P) and ˆ CBR(P), respectively:
ˆ CBL(P) = −γP(ˆ xBR(P)−µ)
2+γB
h
(µ −xBR)
2−(ˆ xBR(P)−xBR)
2
i
(13)
ˆ CBR(P) = −γP(ˆ xBL(P)−µ)
2+γB
h
(µ −xBL)
2−(ˆ xBL(P)−xBL)
2
i
(14)
where ˆ xB(P) = αxP+(1−α)xB, with α =
γP
γP+γB.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 7 suggests that the lobbying power of one businessmen offsets the other’s, in the
sense that when the winning candidate has not committed to any policy, then a centrist policy will
be chosen ex post regardless of who was elected. However, as may be veriﬁed algebraically, an
increase in competition for rents – either an increase in the value γB that the businessmen place
on policy, or an increase in the distance of the businessmen’s ideal points from the center – will
result in larger compensation being paid by the businessmen. Intuitively, the more the businessmen
care about policy, the more the elected politician (businessman or professional politician) will be
able to demand. Since such an increase in stakes has no effect on the policies to be pursued in the
absence of commitment, and hence no change in voters’ preferences over the three candidates, the
result will be a greater incentive for businessmen to enter the race as candidates.
Proposition 8. The greater the competition for rents, the more “likely” will be an equilibrium with
one or more businessman candidates.12
12i.e. such an equilibrium will exist for a wider range of parameter values.
15Proof. Omitted.
As competition for rents increases, each businessman will be more inclined to enter the race to
earn rents for himself rather than transfer them to the winning candidate.
4 Businessman Candidates in Contemporary Russia
In this section we illustrate our arguments by drawing on post-communist Russia’s experience with
electoral politics. We describe the phenomenon of businessman candidacy in Russia, demonstrate
that the emergence of such candidates is related to the weakness of democratic institutions and
consequentinabilityofcandidatestomakebindingcampaignpromises, andprovidesomeevidence
that strong competition for rents may increase the incentive of Russian businessmen to run for
ofﬁce.
4.1 The Phenomenon
VariousscholarsofcontemporaryRussiahavenotedtheincreasinglydirectinvolvementofRussian
businessmen in electoral politics. While the potential presidential aspirations of former Yukos head
Mikhail Khodorkovskii may have made the headlines, the reality is that representatives of business
occupy numerous elected positions at the federal, regional, and local level.13
To get a sense for the scale of the phenomenon, we compiled a list of “businessman candidates”
in gubernatorial elections between 1997 and 2003, drawing on Russian Central Election Commis-
sion data and newspaper reports.14 The appendix presents our (possibly incomplete) list. By our
count, between1997and2003therewere38non-trivialbusinessmancandidaciesforthepostofre-
gional executive, where “businessman candidate” is deﬁned as a candidate serving as a manager or
principal owner of a business at the time of the election, and “non-trivial” means that the candidate
received at least 10 percent of the vote. The 35 elections with such candidacies (three regions had
13See, e.g., Barnes (2003); Orttung (2004); Ol’ga Kryshtanovskaia, “Kremlevskie Zavsegdatai [Kremlin Regulars],”
Vremia MN, February 13, 2003.
14RegionalexecutivesinRussiaareknownvariouslyas“governor,” “president,” and(inMoscow, whichhasregional
status) “mayor.” For simplicity, we use “gubernatorial election” to refer to any election for the post of regional
executive.
16multiple candidacies) account for slightly more than a quarter of all gubernatorial elections held
during this period. As the list in the appendix indicates, such candidacies were increasingly effec-
tive over time. While none of the ten businessman candidacies between mid-1997 and November
2000 were effective, in the period which follows ten businessman candidates were elected, and a
further ﬁve advanced to the second round of voting.
There is substantial evidence that businessmen are running in large numbers in other elections
in Russia. For example, the Russian newspaper Kommersant reports that 77 members (out of 450)
of the Duma which served between 1999 and 2003 were “direct representatives” of business, while
66 members of the Duma elected in 2003 were similarly afﬁliated.15 Published and unpublished
data on business representation in the 2003 Duma gathered by the Moscow Times, an English-
language daily, suggests that the latter number may be a substantial underestimate.16
In the discussion which follows, we focus especially on gubernatorial elections in Russia. We
do so because the environment in which such elections take place is closest to that in our model (in
contrast, half the Duma is elected through party-list voting), and because – unlike Duma deputies
– Russia’s governors do not possess legal immunity. The latter distinction is important, as it is
possible in principle that businessmen run for the Duma to avoid prosecution. That said, business
representatives in the Duma are for the most part not the major shareholders and CEOs of their
corporations who are most legally vulnerable.17
4.2 Reputational Mechanisms and Commitment in Russian Politics
A central proposition in the literature on electoral competition is that parties, longer-lived than can-
didates, develop policy reputations which their members ignore at their peril (Alesina and Spear,
1988; Cox and McCubbins, 1994; Aldrich, 1995). In Russia, parties are young and – especially
in regional politics – weak. The consequence is that elected ofﬁcials have greater opportunity to
pursue their own preferences, increasing the incentive for businessmen to run for public ofﬁce.
That Russia’s parties are young is obvious: electoral politics in one form or another has existed
15Dmitrii Butrin, “Biznes i Vlast’: Zakonodatel’nyi Sovet Direktorov [Business and Power: Legislative Board of
Directors],” Kommersant, December 26, 2003.
16Francesca Mereu, “Duma Has a Big Business Lobby,” Moscow Times, January 20, 2004; Francesca Mereu, private
communication.
17See, for example, the list in Mereu, “Duma Has a Big Business Lobby,” op. cit.
17in Russia for only a bit over a decade. The one exception, of course, is the Communist Party,
which not only inherited a substantial grass-roots network but a particular policy reputation from
its predecessor, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Most of the remaining party system has
been a kaleidescope, with parties emerging to contest one election, only to disappear the next. The
record of these parties in establishing clearly-deﬁned platforms is mixed, with the long succession
of “parties of power” which have beneﬁtted from Kremlin patronage especially notable for their
lack of ideological underpinnings.18
Compounding the inability of parties to act as reputational mechanisms is the fact that many
candidates run as independents rather than party nominees. This is especially the case in regional
elections. Between 1995 and 1999, 45 percent of gubernatorial elections were not contested by
a single party-nominated candidate; over the next four years, the ﬁgure was 63 percent (Golosov,
2004). Even this tends to overestimate the importance of parties at the regional level, with party
nominees accounting for a mere 15 and 7 percent, respectively, of the winning candidates in the
two electoral cycles. Further, many of the parties active at the regional level are not national but
local parties with little ideological orientation (McFaul, 2001).
There is much investigation into the causes of Russia’s weak party system (see, e.g., Stoner-
Weiss, 2001; McFaul, 2001; Hale, forthcoming). We are interested in the consequences of this
weakness for the nature of electoral competition. Some suggestive evidence is provided by Colton
(2000, pp.106-107), whocitessurveyevidencethatonly17percentofRussianstrustorcompletely
trust political parties, a ﬁgure lower than that for any state institution. This lack of trust in parties
presumably translates into a lack of faith in party nominees’ campaign promises. Combined with
the fact that most regional candidates are not party nominees at all, the result is a politics that is
highly “personalistic” (Hough, 1998; Stoner-Weiss, 2001). Candidate identity, rather than party
platform, is what matters.
The importance of candidate identity came up frequently in conversations we had with indi-
viduals connected to a much-discussed businessman candidacy: the election to the Krasnoyarsk
governorship of Aleksandr Khloponin, former general director of Norilsk Nickel, one of the two
main industrial enterprises in the region.19 Khloponin apparently received substantial ﬁnancial
18Rose and Munro (2002) and Colton and McFaul (2003) discuss the nature of national political parties in Russia.
19Petrov (1999), Yorke (2003), and Ivanov (2002) describe the recent political history of the region. Krasnikov
18support from Interros, the parent company of Norilsk Nickel, and Khloponin was widely seen as
Interros’s candidate. Indeed, Khloponin did overwhelmingly better among voters in areas domi-
nated by Norilsk Nickel, suggesting that voters believed that he would protect the interests of the
company from which he had emerged.
Khloponin’s major competitor in the campaign was Aleksandr Uss, a professional politician
with no direct connection to any enterprise in the region who, having been spurned by the Kremlin-
backed Unity party, started his own regional party in 2001 (Krasnikov 2002). After some initial
hesitation, Uss was backed in his campaign by Russian Aluminum (RusAl), the owner of Krasno-
yarsk’s other major industrial enterprise. One elected ofﬁcial from the region told us that RusAl
wavered in its support of Uss, knowing that Uss might turn around and abandon the company after
the election. However, in the end, they did support Uss, having less to fear from him than from
Khloponin, a theme to which we turn in the next section.
4.3 Competition for Rents in Russia’s Regions
As Section 3 showed, the incentive for businessmen to run for public ofﬁce when campaign
promises are not binding may be larger when competition for rents among businesses is strong.
As any observer of postcommunist political economy would attest, competition for rents among
Russian businesses over the past decade has been intense indeed.
Some evidence of the relative level of competition is provided by the World Business Environ-
ment Survey (WBES), conducted by the World Bank in 80 countries in 2000.20 When asked how
problematic was “anticompetitive behavior by other enterprises or the government,” 55 percent of
Russian ﬁrms responded that such behavior was a major or moderate obstacle. (The corresponding
ﬁgure for countries at a similar income level was 52 percent, while the ﬁgure for OECD countries
in which the WBES was conducted varied from 14 to 43 percent.) Consistent with our story, the
competition for favorable treatment in Russia manifests itself in a high “bribe tax” which must be
paid to government ofﬁcials. 61 percent of Russian ﬁrms report that “unofﬁcial payments to public
ofﬁcials” exceed one percent of total revenues, in contrast to 44 percent of ﬁrms in countries at a
(2003) is a major source on the 2002 gubernatorial elections. We conducted interviews with various individuals
connected with the two major campaigns for the governorship.
20For details on the survey, see Batra, Kaufmann and Stone (2003).
19similar income level and fewer than 30 percent of ﬁrms in OECD countries.
Such competition has been driven in part by the large rents to be earned from natural-resource
extraction and government reliance on this sector for tax revenues. In Krasnoyarsk, the two major
enterprises in the region account for the vast majority of taxes paid to the regional government, and
the possibility that Khloponin would use his position to reapportion some of the tax burden from
Norilsk Nickel to Russian Aluminum was much discussed by the individuals we interviewed. That
possibility, together with regional government control over electricity production (critically impor-
tant for metals processing), may have been instrumental in Khloponin’s candidacy and RusAl’s
response to it.
While a full empirical study of the determinants of businessman candidacy in Russia is beyond
the scope of this paper, examination of the list of businessman candidates in the appendix provides
further evidence that competition for natural-resource rents in particular is driving businessman
candidacy in Russia. Of the fourteen separate individuals who ran as businessman candidates and
either won or lost but advanced to the second round of voting, nine were owners or top managers
of natural-resource enterprises.21 In addition, the pairwise correlation between the presence in
an election of a businessman candidate who won or advanced to the second round, and an index
of the region’s natural-resource potential (developed by a panel of Russian experts – see Lavrov
(1997)), is .271 (p = .002), evidence of a strong relationship between competition for rents and
businessman candidacy.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a model of “businessman candidates.” Our primary result is that
businessmen will be more likely to bypass conventional means of inﬂuence and run for public
ofﬁce themselves when commitment mechanisms such as political parties which enable candidates
to make binding campaign promises are weak or nonexistent. We have secondarily shown that,
given the absence of such commitment mechanisms, the incentive for businessmen to enter may
be greater when there is competition for rents among businesses.
21In particular, these candidates represented ﬁrms involved in metals (Loginov, Khloponin, Sovmen), diamonds
(Tumusov, Shtyrov), oil (Abramovich, Zolotarev), gas (Sokolovskii), and ﬁshing (Dar’kin).
20While not a general theory of the “political boundaries of the ﬁrm,” the model here does present
an explanation for what seems to be a great deal of variation in the degree to which businesses
contract out their inﬂuence activities. A question for further examination is whether our results are
sensitivetotheparticularelectoralrule–therunoffrule–whichwechosetoillustrateourargument
(and which governs gubernatorial elections in contemporary Russia, the example on which we
focus). Our intuition is that similar results will obtain under any electoral rule which encourages
convergence to some set of policies among candidates able to make binding campaign promises.
As emphasized by Cox (1990), for a wide class of electoral rules there will be convergence to
centrist positions so long as the number of candidates in an election is sufﬁciently small. That said,
our results do not necessarily hinge on “centripetal” pressures in electoral competition: if either a
businessmanorprofessionalpoliticianwouldbeforcedtoadoptaparticularpositionsomewhereon
the political spectrum when campaign promises are binding, then as in our model the businessman
may pay the politician to run in his place.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Label the candidates i = 1,2, and use Ei ≡ E
h
−γi(x−xi)
2
i
to refer to the expected policy payoff
for candidate i, given commitment/noncommitment decisions by all the candidates. As in the body
of the text, we use xi to denote candidate i’s ideal point, and ˆ xi the policy committed to by candidate
i. In addition, we refer to the policy expected to be pursued ex post by a candidate i who has not
committed as ¯ xi (which for a professional politician P is ¯ x(P), given by Proposition 1, and for the
businessman is xB). We follow the convention that −i refers to the candidate who is not candidate
i.
First observe that (ˆ x1, ˆ x2) = (xm,xm) is an equilibrium: if either candidate deviated, the other
candidate would win for sure, resulting in the same expected policy payoff but a loss of v
2 (the
exogenous rent obtained with probability 1
2) for the candidate who deviated.
Next observe that there is no equilibrium where each candidate commits, but at least one does
not commit to xm. Assume to the contrary that such an equilibrium exists. There are three mutually
21exclusive and exhaustive possibilities, depending on the conﬁguration of positions chosen by the
two candidates:
1. One of the candidates i wins with certainty. But then the other candidate −i can adopt ˆ xi
and win with probability 1
2 (gaining v
2). Since doing so does not change E−i (since ˆ xi is still
adopted with certainty), this will always be preferable to not deviating.
2. Candidates 1 and 2 tie, with ˆ x1 = ˆ x2 6=xm. But then either of the two candidates has an incen-
tive to move some inﬁnitesimal ε towards xm, resulting in essentially the same policy payoff
but a gain of v
2 for the candidate deviating (since that candidate now wins with certainty).
3. Candidates 1 and 2 tie, with ˆ x1 and ˆ x2 some distance D on either side of xm (so that the
median voter is indifferent between the two policies). But then either candidate i = 1,2 has
an incentive to commit instead to xm, thus winning for sure (and therefore gaining v
2) while
producing a higher Ei since:
−γi(xm−xi)
2 > −
γi
2
h
(xm−D−xi)
2+(xm+D−xi)
2
i
(15)
Next we verify that there is no equilibrium in which one candidate does not commit. Assume
to the contrary that such an equilibrium exists, and without loss of generality, assume that it is
candidate 2 who has not committed. There are four mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities,
depending on the position chosen by candidate 1:
1. Candidate 2 wins with certainty. But then candidate 1 can commit to ¯ x2 and win with prob-
ability 1
2, gaining at least v
2 since E1 remains the same. (Note that if candidate 1 is the
businessman, then candidate 1 gains more than v
2 by this deviation, since with probability 1
2
the businessman no longer need pay compensation to candidate 2 ex post.)
2. Candidate 1 wins with certainty. But then candidate 2 can do better by committing to ˆ x1, by
the same logic as when both candidates commit.
3. Candidates 1 and 2 tie, with ˆ x1 = ¯ x2. But then candidate 1 has an incentive to move some
inﬁnitesimal ε towards xm and win with certainty, resulting in essentially the same E1 but
gaining at least v
2 (where if candidate 1 is the businessman, the gain is greater than v
2, since
the businessman no longer must pay compensation to candidate 2 with probability 1
2).
224. Candidates 1 and 2 tie, with ˆ x1 = xm−(¯ x2−xm), so that the candidates are D ≡ |¯ x2−xm| on
either side of xm, implying that the median voter is indifferent between the two candidates.
But then candidate 1 can instead commit to xm, winning with certainty and gaining at least v
2
(more, if the deviating candidate is the businessman, who now with probability 0 must pay
compensation ex post) while increasing E1, by the same logic as in point 3 of the discussion
of the case where both candidates commit.
Finally, we check that there is no equilibrium in which neither candidate commits. Assume to
the contrary that such an equilibrium exists. There are two possibilities, depending on the prior
history of the game:
1. |¯ x1−xm|6=|¯ x2−xm|, so that the median voter prefers one candidate to the other. But then the
losing candidate can always commit to ¯ xi, the policy that will be implemented by the winning
candidate i, resulting in the same E−i for the losing candidate −i while gaining that candidate
at least v
2 (more, if the deviating candidate is the businessman, who with probability 1
2 no
longer need pay compensation ex post).
2. ¯ x1 and ¯ x2 are located on opposite sides of xm, with |¯ x1−xm| = |¯ x2−xm|, so that the median
voter is indifferent between the two candidates. But then either candidate i=1,2 can instead
commit to xm and win for sure, gaining at least v
2 (more, if the deviating candidate is the
businessman, who now with probability 0 must pay compensation ex post) while increasing
Ei by the logic of the cases where one or both candidates commit.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
We label the candidates and follow notation as in the proof of Proposition 2.
First observe that (ˆ x1, ˆ x2, ˆ x3) = (xm,xm,xm) is an equilibrium: if any candidate deviated, that
candidate could not win the ﬁrst round with certainty, and at best would enter the second round
against one of the other two candidates, against whom he would lose (since the other candidate
occupies xm). Thus, a deviation results in the same expected policy payoff but a loss of v
3 (the
exogenous rent obtained with probability 1
3) for the candidate who deviated.
Next observe that there is no equilibrium where all candidates commit, with at least one com-
mitting to a policy other than xm. Assume to the contrary that such an equilibrium exists. There
23are six mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities, depending on the conﬁguration of positions
chosen by the three candidates:
1. One candidate i wins outright in the ﬁrst round. Note that this implies that ˆ xi is closer to
xm than is the position occupied by any other candidate. But then either of the other two
candidates can adopt ˆ xi and win with probability 1
2 (either tying for ﬁrst place or for second
place in round 1, since the two candidates now occupying ˆ xi will collectively gain at least the
majority previously earned by candidate i alone), resulting in no change in the policy payoff
for the deviating candidate but gaining him v
2.
2. One candidate i wins for sure in the second round. Note that this implies that ˆ xi is closer to
xm than is the position occupied the other candidate who enters the second round. But then
the candidate who fails to enter the second round can adopt ˆ xi and win with probability 1
2,
resulting in no change in the policy payoff for that candidate but gaining him v
2. (In the event
that the two losing candidates tie in the ﬁrst round, then either of the two candidates may
deviate in this manner.)
3. Exactly two candidates i = 1,2 have a chance of winning in the second round, with the two
candidates occupying the same ˆ xi 6= xm. But then the third candidate can adopt the same ˆ xi
and win with probability 1
3, resulting in no change in the policy payoff E3 for that candidate
but gaining him v
3.
4. Exactly two candidates i=1,2 have a chance of winning in the second round, with ˆ x1 and ˆ x2
some distance D on either side of xm. But then the third candidate can adopt either ˆ x1 or ˆ x2.
By doing so, this candidate ties for second in the ﬁrst round and thus enter the second round
with probability 1
2, resulting in the same contest of positions in the second round and hence
the same policy payoff E3, but gaining that candidate v
4 (since he wins with probability 1
4).
5. All three candidates have an equal probability of winning in the second round, with the three
candidates i = 1,2,3 occupying the same ˆ xi 6= xm. But then any of the three candidates can
instead commit to a position some inﬁnitesimal ε towards xm and win outright, resulting in
essentially the same policy payoff but gaining that candidate 2V
3 (since he now wins with
certainty rather than with probability 1
3).
246. All three candidates win in the second round with some positive probability, with two can-
didates some distance D to one side of xm, and the other candidate the same distance D to
the other side. Thus, the candidate alone to one side always enters against one of the other
two candidates, so that the second round always pits (xm−D) against (xm+D). But then the
candidate i alone to one side of xm can instead adopt xm and win for sure, gaining that can-
didate v
2 (since he now wins with certainty rather than with probability 1
2), while increasing
his policy payoff Ei since:
−γi(xm−xi)
2 > −
γi
2
h
(xm−D−xi)
2+(xm+D−xi)
2
i
(16)
Next we verify that there is no equilibrium in which at least one candidate does not commit.
Assume to the contrary that such an equilibrium exists. There are six mutually exclusive and
exhaustive possibilities, corresponding to the six cases when all three candidates have committed:
1. One candidate i wins outright in the ﬁrst round. But then:
(a) when the winning candidate has committed to some policy ˆ xi, by the logic of the case
where all commit, one of the losing candidates can commit to ˆ xi and win with proba-
bility 1
2, gaining v
2.
(b) when the winning candidate i has not committed to any policy (thus implying policy
¯ xi), by the same logic one of the losing candidates can commit to ¯ xi and win with
probability 1
2,where the gain from doing so is at least v
2 (more, if the deviating candidate
is the businessman, who with probability 1
2 no longer need pay compensation ex post).
2. One candidate i wins for sure in the second round. But then:
(a) when the winning candidate has committed to some policy ˆ xi, by the logic of the case
where all commit, the candidate who fails to enter the second round (or one of the two
remaining candidates, if those two candidates tie in the ﬁrst round) can adopt ˆ xi and
win with probability 1
2, gaining v
2.
(b) when the winning candidate i has not committed to any policy (thus implying policy
¯ xi), by the same logic the candidate who fails to enter the second round (or one of the
two remaining candidates, if those two candidates tie in the ﬁrst round) can adopt ¯ xi
25and win with probability 1
2, gaining at least at least v
2 (more, if the deviating candidate
is the businessman, who with probability 1
2 no longer need pay compensation ex post).
3. Exactly two candidates i = 1,2 have a chance of winning in the second round, with the two
candidates occupying (either through commitment to that policy or because that policy is
implied by noncommitment) the same position. But then:
(a) when both of the winning candidates have committed to the same policy ˆ xi, the third
candidate can adopt the same ˆ xi and win with probability 1
3, thus gaining v
3.
(b) when at least one of the winning candidates i has not committed (so that the winning
candidates have each “adopted” ¯ xi), the third candidate can commit to ¯ xi and win with
probability 1
3, thus gaining at least v
3 (more, if the deviating candidate is the business-
man, who also reduces his expected compensation payment).
4. Exactly two candidates i = 1,2 have a chance of winning in the second round, with the two
candidates occupying (either through commitment to that policy or because that policy is
implied by noncommitment) positions some distance D on either side of xm. But then:
(a) when both of the winning candidates have committed to their policies, by the logic
of the case where all commit, the third candidate can adopt either of the two winning
positions, gaining v
4.
(b) when one of the two winning candidates has not committed, the third candidate can
adopt either of the winning positions and gain at least v
4 (and perhaps more, since if
the deviating candidate is the businessman, he can adopt the policy ¯ xi implied by the
noncommitment of some winning candidate i and reduce his expected compensation
payment).
5. All three candidates have an equal probability of winning in the second round, with the three
candidates i = 1,2,3 occupying either through commitment or noncommitment the same
position x 6= xm. But then any of the three candidates can instead commit to a position some
inﬁnitesimal ε towards xm and win outright, resulting in essentially the same policy payoff
but gaining that candidate at least 2V
3 (more, if the deviating candidate is the businessman
26and one of the professional politicians has not committed, since the businessman no longer
need pay compensation with positive probability).
6. All three candidates win in the second round with some positive probability, with two candi-
dates occupying a position (either through commitment or noncommitment) some distance
D to one side of xm, and the other candidate a position the same distance D to the other side,
where D ≡ (xB−xm). But then by the logic of point 6 in the discussion of the case where
all commit, the candidate alone to one side of xm can instead adopt xm and win for sure,
gaining that candidate at least v
2 (more, if the deviating candidate is the businessman and one
of the professional politicians has not committed, since the businessman no longer need pay
compensation with positive probability) while increasing his policy payoff.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
We ﬁrst show that for certain parameter values there exists an equilibrium in which L and B enter.
By Proposition 2, in equilibrium each candidate will commit to xm, giving an expected policy
payoff of −γiE(xm−xi)
2 for player i ∈ {L,R,B}. (In all that follows, recall that by assumption
q and v are vanishingly small and thus can be ignored whenever there is a discrete difference in
utility from other factors.) Thus:
1. R will not enter if the cost of entry q is greater than his expected gain in exogenous rents
from holding ofﬁce v
3: If he enters, by Proposition 3 all candidates will commit to xm, giving
R the same expected policy payoff, gaining him v
3 (since he wins with probability 1
3), and
costing him q.
2. L will not exit, since then B will win unopposed, giving L a policy payoff of −γL(xB−xL)
2,
which is less than −γLE(xm−xL)
2 due to our assumptions that a) xm is distributed on some
interval T ⊂ [µ −δ,µ +δ], where µ = E(xm) and δ = (xB−µ), and b) (µ −δ) < xL <
µ. (To see this, note that (a) and (b) together imply that (xm−xL)
2 ≤ (xB−xL)
2 for all
realizations of xm.)
3. B will not exit if his equilibrium payoff

−γBE(xm−xB)
2−k+ v
2

is greater than his payoff
from exiting. Clearly, his payoff from not entering depends on whether L will commit or not
27commit when running unopposed off the equilibrium path, since in either case L will win.
If L does commit, he will commit to xL, his most preferred policy, and this is clearly less
preferable to B than L’s not committing (since then B has no opportunity to move L’s policy
by lobbying ex post). Thus, it is sufﬁcient to show that for k sufﬁciently small B prefers the
lottery from receiving an uncertain xm to receiving xL with certainty, i.e. to show that there
exists some combination of xL, xB, and distribution H(·) (of xm) such that:
−γBE(xm−xB)
2 > −γB(xL−xB)
2 (17)
To verify that such an equilibrium exists, observe that for xL arbitrarily close to (µ −δ),
where δ = (xB−µ), (xm−xB)
2 ≤ (xL−xB)
2 for all realizations of xm, since by assumption
xm is distributed on some interval T ⊂ [µ −δ,µ +δ]. (Note that this equilibrium will be
more likely when a) k is small, and b) (xB−xL) is large.)
Next we show that there exist no other equilibria where B enters. Assume to the contrary that
such an equilibrium exists. There are three possibilities:
1. B enters alone. But then by the logic of point (2) above, L will also want to enter.
2. R and B enter, but L does not. But then B will want to exit, since by exiting R will implement
(depending on his strategy off the equilibrium path) either xR (if R commits when running
unopposed, in which case R will commit to his most preferred policy) or ¯ x(R) (if R does
not commit when running unopposed). (Recall that Proposition 1 shows that if R does not
commit and wins, then he will be compensated by B such that he receives exactly the same
utility as if he had implemented xR.) Of these two possibilities, clearly implementing xR
is worse from B’s point of view, so that if B prefers not to enter when R commits off the
equilibrium path, he will also prefer not to enter when R does not commit off the equilibrium
path. Thus, it is sufﬁcient to show that the policy payoff from accepting the lottery over an
uncertain xm is worse than from accepting a certain xR:
−γBE(xm−xB)
2 < −γB(xR−xB)
2 (18)
(xR−xB)
2 < E(xm−xB)
2 (19)
(xR)
2−2xBxR < E
h
(xm)
2
i
−2xBµ (20)
28where we recall that µ = E(xm). Denoting the variance of xm as v(xm), we can use the fact
that v(xm) = E
h
(xm)
2
i
−µ2 to rewrite (20) as:
(xR)
2−2xBxR < v(xm)+µ2−2xBµ (21)
v(xm) > (xR)
2−µ2−2xB(xR−µ) (22)
Since the variance of a random variable is always positive, for (22) to hold it is sufﬁcient to
show that the right-hand side is negative:
(xR)
2−µ2−2xB(xR−µ) < 0 (23)
(xR+µ)(xR−µ) < 2xB(xR−µ) (24)
which is true since xB > xR > µ.
3. L, R, and B all enter. But then B will want to exit, since by Lemmas 2 and 3 the policy payoff
is the same whether there are three candidates or two, and by exiting B can save the entry
cost k.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 6
By Lemmas 2 and 3, in any equilibrium with two or three candidates all candidates commit to xm.
But then:
• There is no equilibrium where both businessmen and the professional politician enter, since
either businessman may deviate and receive the same policy payoff while saving the cost of
entry k.
• There is no equilibrium where one businessman and the professional politician enter. To see
this, observe that if the businessman deviates so that the professional politician P is the only
candidate, P will either commit to his ideal point µ or not commit. Clearly committing is
worse for the businessman, since then he cannot lobby the politician ex post. But a com-
mitment to µ is better for either businessman B than the lottery from receiving an uncertain
xm:
−γB(xB−µ)
2 > −γBE(xB−xm)
2 (25)
29since µ = E(xm).
• There is no equilibrium where a businessman enters alone, by the logic of point 2 in the ﬁrst
part of the proof of Proposition 4.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 7
Policy choice and compensation when a businessman has won the election follow Proposition 1,
since then there is only one businessman to lobby. Note in particular that the policy that maximizes
the joint surplus of the two businessmen is

γB
γB+γBxBL+
γB
γB+γBxBR

= µ. When a politician has won
the election, we exploit the fact that globally truthful compensation schedules imply that the policy
chosen will maximize the joint surplus of the politician and the businessmen (which again means
that the policy chosen will be µ), and that the compensation paid by either businessman must leave
the politician with a payoff equal to that if the politician had instead chosen policy based on the
other businessman’s compensation schedule alone. For example, the compensation paid by BL
must satisfy:
−γP(µ −µ)
2+ ˆ CBL(P)+ ˆ CBR(P) = (26)
−γP(ˆ xBR(P)−µ)
2+
h
ˆ CBR(P)+γBR(µ −xBR)
2−γBR(ˆ xBR(P)−xBR)
2
i
The term in brackets represents the compensation paid by BR if ˆ xBR(P) (the policy that maxi-
mizes the joint surplus of BR and P) rather than µ is implemented, reﬂecting the fact that BR’s
compensation schedule is globally truthful. Simplifying gives the equilibrium contribution.
6.6 Businessman Candidates for Governor in Russia, 1997-2003
Note: The following (likely partial) list, derived from Russian Central Election Commission data
and newspaper accounts, is limited to those businessman candidates who received at least 10 per-
cent of the vote in the ﬁrst round of voting. Winning candidates are listed in bold; candidates not
winning but advancing to the second round of voting are listed in italics.
Sergei Levchenko (Irkutskskaia Oblast’, 7/27/1997), 18.82%
Iurii Antaradonov (Republic of Altai, 12/14/1997), 23.28%
Aleksandr Tikhonov (Moskovskaia Oblast’, 12/19/1999), 15.12%
Pavel Gurkalov (Orenburzhskaia Oblast’, 12/19/1999), 23.16%
30Aleksandr Kirilichev (Primorskii Krai, 12/19/1999), 20.46%
Sergei Potapov (Tverskaia Oblast’, 12/19/1999), 12.49%
Boris Korsunskii (Evreiskaia Avtonomnaia Oblast’, 3/26/2000), 25.71%
Andrei Soluianov (Republic of Udmurtiia, 10/15/2000), 12.17%
Viktor Bibikov (Pskovskaia Oblast’, 11/12/2000), 15.12%
Nikolai Bagretsov (Kurganskaia Oblast’, 11/26/2000), 22.05%
Georgii Greshnykh (Kamchatskaia Oblast’, 12/3/2000), 15.78%
Valerii Van’kov (Komi-Permiatskii Avtonomnyi Okrug, 12/3/2000), 11.04%
Vladimir Loginov (Koriakskii Avtonomnyi Okrug, 12/3/2000), 50.68%
Vladimir Markov (Riazanskaia Oblast’, 12/3/2000), 10.15%
Valerii Riumin (Riazanskaia Oblast’, 12/3/2000), 12.36%
Nikolai Denin (Brianskaia Oblast’, 12/10/2000), 21.15%
Leonid Markelov (Republic of Marii El, 12/17/2000), 58.23%
Oleg Savchenko (Volgogradskaia Oblast’, 12/24/2000), 28.31%
Roman Abramovich (Chukotskii Avtonomnyi Okrug, 12/24/2000), 90.61%
Aleksandr Shmakov (Nenetskii Avtonomnyi Okrug, 1/14/2001), 13.67%
AleksandrKhloponin(Taimyrskii(Dolgano-Nanetskii)AvtonomnyiOkrug, 1/28/2001), 61.97%
Iurii Bobylev (Amurskaia Oblast’, 3/25/2001), 10.80%
Viktor Sokolovskii (Tul’skaia Oblast’, 4/8/2001), 18.62%
Boris Zolotarev (Evenkiiskii Avtonomnyi Okrug, 4/8/2001), 51.8%
Sergei Dar’kin (Primorskii Krai, 5/27/2001), 23.94%
Andrei Kliment’ev (Nizhegorodskaia Oblast’, 7/15/2001), 10.54%
Sergei Krechetov (Republic of Altai, 12/16/2001), 13.34%
Fedot Tumusov (Republic of Sakha (Iakutiia), 12/23/2001), 17.73%
Viacheslav Shtyrov (Republic of Sakha (Iakutiia), 12/23/2001), 45.39%
Khazret Sovmen (Republic of Adygeia, 1/13/2002), 62.84%
Vasilii Popov (Republic of Kareliia, 4/22/2002), 10.37%
Aleksandr Khloponin (Krasnoiarskii Krai, 9/8/2002), 25.25%
Nikolai Ochirov (Republic of Kalmykiia, 10/20/2002), 12.76%
Baatr Shondzhiev (Republic of Kalmykiia, 10/20/2002), 13.61%
Andrei Zinchenko (Magadanskaia Oblast’, 1/26/2003), 10.20%
Mustafa Batdyev (Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkessiia, 8/17/2003), 41.67%
Anton Bakov (Sverdlovskaia Oblast’, 9/7/2003), 14.43%
Sergei Veremeenko (Republic of Bashkortostan, 12/7/2003), 25.38%
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